Introduction
Every society has its own legal orcier, adapting to the specificity and needs of that society. And every legal arder, albeit to a varying degree, has two main layers of legal regulation. One goes to protect the interests of the wh ole of the society as an organized community. This is the layer of public interest. 1t is never wholly absent in any society, lest that society does indeed not exist at all. In every society there are sorne common interests and sorne public weal, i.e. sorne centripetal forces of cohesion. There is therefore always a part of the legal arder which gives expression to these types of interests cornrnon to the rnernbers of the society. On the other hand, there is a part of the legal arder which seeks to serve the interests of each single rnernber of the society. This part of the law grows with the degree of civilization, progressively recognizing a "private autonomy" to any of its single members. Roughly speaking, one has he re the two lay ers of public and priva te law (jus publicum /jus privatum ). The interests lying at the bottom of each of these layers are different: the interests of the wh ole on the one side (utilitas publica); the interests of the single merubers on the other (utilitas singulorum). 1 The content of each legal orcier can be analyzed as a ta king of stock of these two layers and also as an inquiry into 1 On this issue, from a historical standpoint, see e.g. M. Kaser, "lus publicum und ius privatum", Zeitschrift der Savigngy-Stiftungfor Rechtsgesclzichte, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 103, 1986, pp. 1 ff., :1.4 ff.; A. Steinwenter, "Utilitas pub !ica, utilitas singulorum", Essays in Ho nor of P. Koschuker their dynamic relationships. It must moreover be noted that "community" is a relative matter. The point is not always to qualif)r by this concept the State or the univers al international community ( all States and also sometimes all human beings, as well as sometimes also allliving creatures). The community of a number of riparian States is also a community; the community of States bound by a treaty is also a community; etc. What is decisive here is that a "whole" opposes the single members, and thus two sets of distinct interests differentiate themselves.
As we have just hinted at, international law is no exception to this general statement about the complexion oflegal orders. lt has always had its common concerns and also its concern for the weal of the single members. The "international community" has always loomed somewhere behind the protection of the sovereign rights of the States. 2 Tt is tme that the "egoistic" wing on the rights of the single States and the powers flowing from their sovereignty has for a long ti me ta ken pride of place in the legal analysis of internationallaw. 3 However, the common concerns have been present all the time and have been strongly rediscovered since World War II. Doubtlessly, the layer of public law is more developed and better visible in the collectivities taking the name of States. These are communities where common organs take care of the implementation of the general weal and where the national feeling of the members of the society gives sorne inn er cohesion to the collectivity. This is not so in international society. But even here, one observes as a matter of empiric reality the existence of a series of common concerns. These are questions of peace and territmy in the 19th century, later questions concerning common as sets ( e.g. international rivers ), stilllater questions of international cooperation (through the international organizations since 1919), and today issues of human rights, disarmament, protection of the environment, etc. 4 To be surè, the relative weight and the type of interaction between the two legallayers differ in international law and in municipal law. However, the gist of the matter remains the same, namely that there are these two branches of the law and that they are in constant interaction.
It stands to reason that the two branches of the law mentioned above are conceptually distinct and fulfil different functions in the legal order, but also that they are intimately linked one with the other. ln many cases, the protection of priva te interests represents also a public interest; and vite versa. A collectivity London, 1964. can prosper only if its single members live in a satisfactory environment and can unfold the ir lives. Th us, for example, the recognition of liberties and individual rights for the members is not only an interest of the latter, but also a collective interest. Conversely, the individual can only prosper if the collectivity in which he lives is strong enough to properly display its functions. The sacrifices he concedes for the bene fit of the collectivity, e.g. through the paying of taxes, are at !east to sorne extent also in his own best interest. These interrelationships between the two layers do not dissolve their conceptual polarity and difference; they add a further leve! of inquiry as to the effects of the one on the other.
lt is not out of place to try to read the case law of the PCIJ (1921-1939/1946 ) 5 in the light of the two mentionecllayers, in order to see which of its pronouncements relate to the first and which on es relate to the second. 6 The choice of the PCIJ flows from two considerations. First, the PCIJ existed in a time, which is still perceived today as a sort of heyday of State sovereignty. Indeed, among the most famous dicta of the Court are the ones relating to the sovereignty of the State, nam ely in the Lotus case of 1927. The layer of common interests is generally unrolled in legal doctrine by beginning with the r CJ, with the Reparations for Injuries or the Genocide Convention advisory opinions of 1949 and 1951. It is therefore not out of order to cast light on the fact that the "common interest"-limb was already largely present in the jurisprudence of the Pc IJ. Second, the case law of the PCIJ is reasonably concise to fit the imposed spatial limitations of the present contribution. If 1 was to venture into the ICJ, 1 would have either to section the analysis or alternatively to exceed in length.
Before plunging into the analysis, it may be useful to recall that the distinction into the two utilitates is not always straightforward, since there are legal institutions which are straddling over the two continents, even if they seem sometimes rooted more prominently in the one than in the other. Three short examples of this matter of fact may be given. First, there is the institution of diplomatie protection, recognized by the PCIJ for the first time in the Mavrommatis Concessions case (1924) . 7 This institution is rooted first of ali in a singular utility, in that it allows aState to protect its interests and those of its citizens, when considered important enough to mobilize public expenditure 9 The singular utility side is obvious: aState will acquire rights and thus satisfY its territorial interests. But there is also a public utility side: the acquisition of rights and correlative Joss of rights by prescription is based on the public interest of legal security and termination of disputes. The latter aspect is emblematically stated in the formula 'in te rest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium'. 10 Many other examples to the same effect could be given. We will therefore mention in the following pages the legal institutions and arguments of the PCIJ where the one or the other utility prevails, sometimes also venturing into the mention of correlative shares of the other utility in the question at stake. The analysis will follow qui te largely a chronologicalline. A word of warning may be added. The re ader should possess sorne degree ofknowledge of international law. Otherwise, he or she should consult for example the Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Max Planck) on a series of concepts we will be mentioning without venturing into explanations asto their meaning (for example: "minimum standard of treatment"). Fin ally, and this goes almost without saying, the list of utilities given in the next two sections is merely illustrative and do es neither exhaust the jurisprudence nor the relevant utterances of the PCIJ. However, the most important issues will hopefully be mentioned.
II
The PCIJ and Utilitas Publica . Th us, this canal had become an "international waterway" and was partially extracted from the domestic jurisdiction of Germany. This international concern régime had the remarkable consequence that Germany lost the right to take unilateral restrictive measures even in case of a state of war-a vety significant restriction on its sovereignty.l 2 z. Minimum Standard ofTreatment. In more than one case, the P CIJ defended the "minimum standard" rather than the "national standard" of treatment of aliens.J3 The Court expressed it that way, e.g. in the Certain German Interests case (merits, 1926), 14 and later in the Peter Pazmany case (1933). 15 It did so even in the specifie context of minorities, as the Minority Schools inAlbania ad vis my opinion (1935) 16 shows. There is here the Kantian idea of a certain "absolute" international cluty to concede a minimum standard of treatment to ali ens (or minorities, by reas on of conventional duties ), notwithstanding how a State treats its own nationals. In other words, the ill treatment of your own citizens does not give you the right to mistreat also the citizens of other States; or: the ill treatment of a class of persons does not create the right to ill treat further classes of persans. It stands to rea son th at this minimum civilization standard 11 PCIJ, ser. A, no. 1, pp. 22-23. 12 Thus, a minority of judges was not prepared togo that far: Diss. Op. An:zilotti 1 Huber, ibid., p. 35 ff., and Diss. Op. Schücking, ibid., p. 43 ff. 3· Check on abuse andfraud. The PCIJ checked that the law was correctly applied and sought to curb any fraud or abuse in the application. Th us, in the Certain Germanfnterests case (merits, 1926),l7 it verified to what extent the sale of an industrial plant was made in.fàrudem creditorum or represented an abuse of rights. What is here at stake, from the van tage point of the Court, is the credibility of the proceedings initiated in front of it and the authority of the law itself. The Court is the guardian of these assets:jura novit curia. Conversely, any excessive leniency in this regard may have as a consequence a loss of credibility and of authority for the Court, and for international law. This would be contrary to a public in te rest of international society or community.
4· Non-derogation. In the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia case (1928), 18 the PCIJ made a highly interesting excursion into a type of peremptory norm predating the special régime of article 53/ 64 VCLT. It recognized that a minority protection convention containecl in its first section provisions which could not be derogated from by the parties. The régime was one for a minimum of protection and the relevant provisions were thus "intangible". 19 Conversely, the provisions in the second section of the agreement allowed the parties to add protections for the minorities, but not to diminish the protections contained in the first section. Any interpretation of the provisions of the second section must thus take account of this relation of priority conceded to the provisions of the first section. Beyond this particular case, the PCIJ often recognized the régime for the protection of minorities as a fundamental common concern of the then international community, essentially linked with the well-being of peoples and with the maintenance of international peace. One may here recall, among others, the German Settlers in Poland opinion (1923) , where the Court stressed the "international interest" in the protection of the relevant persons;2° the Acquisition of Polish Nationality opinion (1923) 24 the PCIJ affirmed that it had to interpret the relevant convention in the light of general principles of international fluvial law, whose gist was a 'certain community of interests among the riparian States'. This community is a community of law and of equality among all States bordering on an international river. The Court thus emphatically rejects any idea of a "Harmon doctrine", whereby each ri parian State is wholly sovereign and can do whatever it wants over the section of the river traversing its own terri tory. On the contrary, the Court stressee! duties of cooperation and of consultation among the ri parian States, which are at the present time part and parce! of general international law. The public utility is here the one of the 'community of riparian States' and accounts for a rational and mutually beneficia! administration of the common good entrusted to them. The interests of th at collectivity can enter into sharp contrast with the interests of a single riparian. The issue is then one of interpretation: in sorne contexts the individual interest will prevail, but in many others the common interest will have to be given precedence. A public utility is here sharply cast into the limelight. Sorne individual or dissenting opinions also prominently feature in this category, such as nam ely a Diss. Op. of Judge Van Eysinga, who considers that the legal act by which the régime of the Congo basin was created was of a constitutional and peremptory nature. 25 6. Territory and boundaries. In a series of cases, the PCIJ insisted on the fact (as would later do the ICJ) that the fixation of boundaries between States is a matter where the certainty and finality of the delimitation effectuated is of a central interest. Thus, in thejaworzina opinion (1923), 26 the PCIJ buttressed the competence of the Allied Conference of Ambassadors to arbitra te on the final course of a boundary, stressing among others that no section of the boundary was to be left without clear determination. In the Mossul case (1925), 27 which was based on a similar legal question, the Court added the importance to fine! a final and binding solution to the dispute. The issue is one of eliminating a class of disputes which easily le ad to friction and war ( interest rei publicae, ut sitfinis litium). The same scheme can be found in the Monastery ofSt.-Naoum opinion 28 One knows how much the modern international law recognizes the importance of the stability of boundaries, e.g. though the uti possidetisprinciple or through exceptions to ordinary régimes, such as article 62, § 2, of the VCLT. Boundaries are one of the most sensitive issues of international security. There is a salient and powerful public interest in keeping stability in this area, upon which many of the wheels of international law of peace rest.
7· Integrity of an international legal régime. The PCIJ had occasion to limit references ta municipal law, which could have jeopardized the proper functioning of an international legal régime. In particular, if the reference in a treaty was for regulation of a question by municipal law, the manifest danger would have been to end up with a series of different and even divergent regulations, installing inequality among the States and hampering a unitary functioning of the legal régime. Th us, in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations opinion (1925), 29 the Court refused to interpret the relevant Lausanne Convention of1923 as operating a reference to municipal law (so that the word 'established at' would have to be interpreted according to the law on domicile in the Turkish national system). Such an interpretation would have created practical problems and inequalities between the two parties, since the reference would have be en to changing sets of national legislation. This was also contrary to the aim of a proper and swift implementation of the Convention, which the Court considered a paramount aspect of the conventional regulation. The public interest was here to main tain the unity and the proper functioning of the convention . as a common enterprise. This common interest opposed the singular interest ofTurkey in the particular situation. This interest was not only common to the two parties, but of more general rea ch: the different States of the international community had an obvions interest to eliminate as quickly as possible a seed of disco rd and of possible armed conflict in the Mediterranean.
8. Nemojudex in re sua. In the Mossul opinion (1925), 30 the PCIJ had ta consider how the Council of the League of Nations had ta vote on a competence which was granted ta it un der a treaty distinct from the Covenant of 1919. The Court held that the Council had to function according to the rules uncler the Covenant and therefore that since the issue was one of deciding on a dispute, the special rules of article 15, 99 6 and 7, of the Covenant had to be applied.
The consequence was that the votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute were not to be counted when computing the unanimity as required z8 PCIJ, ser. B, no. g, pp. 14-15. KOLB by the general rule under article 5 of the Covenant. The unanimity had to be considered as being reached if all the other representatives, except those of the parties in dispute, voted in favor of the proposal. The Court adds a general reason for this interpretation, which is also the basis of the special rule under article 15 of the Covenant: no body shall be judge in its own cause; nemojudex in re sua. There is a manifest public utility behind the rule. First, a decision shall be able to be taken; if the right of veto of every party to the dispute was recognized, practically no decision could ever be taken, thus wholly sterilizing an important social function of the Co un cil in settling disputes. Second, wh en parties vote in their own cause, there is a sense of manipulation, as opposed to the ide a that justice "must a iso be seen to be done". This a iso affects the public perception and therefore the effectiveness of the outcome, as weil as the authority of the decision-making process in the medium and long mn. H owever, all of the se are public utilities.
9· Interest rei publicae, ut sitfinis litium. As already mentioned, the terminatian of disputes is an important public interest, sin ce it serves the preservation of public peace. The PCIJ put stress on this issue severa! times. In the European Commission of the Danube opinion (1927) , 31 it considered that a dispute had been resolved by a treaty on the basis of a pre-war regulation, rather than to adopta reading leaving a gap in the resolution of the dispute. Much la ter, the PCIJ laid stress on the finality and executory character of an arbitral award: Société Commerciale de Belgique (1939) . 32 One may here also recall the territorial and boundary disputes already mentioned above (see under no. 6).
10. Effèctiveness of international action. In the Interpretation of the GraecoTurkish Agreement opinion (1928) , 33 the PCIJ insisted on an interpretation which would further the effectiveness of international action, as compared with legal constructions that would decrease such effectiveness. In particular, it refused to construe the relevant provisions in such a way as to hamper the action of the Mixed Commission handling the disputes relating to the exchange of populations between the two States wh ose affairs were und er consideration. The Court also stressed that the spirit of the agreements is to render as easy and swift as possible the implementation of the task of the Commission, which had to opera te in conditions of significant urgency. This effective ness of international action is rooted in a public utility. It is linked with the proper working of an international institution in the interest of the solution of a thomy dispute and of the maintenance of peace in the region. (1932) , 34 the Court carefully selected an interpretation of the relevant texts that would exp and the domain ofjurisdiction of the ILO to regula te the matter und er consideration. This course can be se en e.g. in the reasoning of the Court relating to the question asto whether the regula tory power of the Organization extencled only to manual workers or also to other classes of employees. The Court referred here to the object and purpose of the relevant agreement. It held that, in that light, it could not be considerecl that the jurisdiction of the , 1 LO was so narrowly limited asto exclucle the latter class of persons 35 (one may notice that the argument is negative: it is not reasonable to suppose that ... ). n. FJfectiveness of treaties. The interpretation of agreements was the great issue over which the PCIJ was constantly callecl to express itself. It pursued in this area a legal policy of protecting the conventional bonds against unilateralism, exceptionalism, and other weakening deviees. It was at pains to keep strong the concept that an agreement is based on a common enterprise, impressing it with a sense of mutual trust and of mutual duties. First, the PCIJ was vigilant to protect the integrity and equilibrium reached through an agreement against any upsetting mechanisms. Th us, in the Polish War Vessels in the Port o_j'Danzig opinion (1931) , 36 the Court refused to expand the reach of a conventional regulation which concerned the access to the port for commercial ships and not for warships. lt rejected the invitation to interpret into the relevant convention an expansion of the obligations of one State party, in the absence of any clue in the convention as to an agreement on the privileged treatment of warships. Su ch an expansion would have upset the equilibrium within the convention and also limited considerably sensitive territorial rights of one party. Second, in the Pree Zones case (1932) 39 lt here rejected an argument of the Netherlands which would have had as a result the unlawfulness of a new water canal when have laid on the existing one, whereas its lawfulness would have been secured if it was established near the olcl one, even if only by a few meters. Fourth, the Court refused to countenance a special sense of words, if thereby the extent of the rights and obligations incurred would have been upset. Famously, in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case (1933), 40 the Court refused to take the word 'Eastern Greenland' as meaning 'Greenland' altogether. In the Lighthouses case of 1934, 41 the Court considered that an intention to restrict a contractual régime to the lighthouses intended to remain in Turkish hands could not be presumed; the presumption had rather to be th at the scope of the régime applicable had remained unaltered. The Court came back on this issue, in another context, in theLighthouses (Crete and Samos) case ofl937: 42 the relevant provision contained a clause of general reach, without any restrictions or exceptions, covering all terri tories detached from Turkey during the Balkan wars. There was nothing in the text allowing distinguishing between different terri tories. Thus, the Court refused to engage in such a course. Fifth, the Court always tried to interpret the provisions at hand in such a way as to avoid creating a legal gap. In the Peter Pazmany case (1933), 43 the Court emphatically rejected an interpretation that would have created a gap as to the régime of "public" goods, not covered by the proposed and rejected construction. The care of the Court to protect the conventional régimes against maneuvers of different types is not rooted only in a priva te interest of the parties.lt is also an expression of a public utility, in that the treaty is the main vehicle for international cooperation. The Court understood that it had to protect this fundamental vehicle against attacks of different types, if the credihility of that vehicle for international cooperation was to be maintained as unalterecl as possible.
12. Rule of Law. In a most peculiar opinion, the Court had to express on the compatibility of certain decrees with the constitution of the Free City of Danzig, which was under the protection of the League of Nations. 44 The decrees emanated from the Nazi forces at power there. They were incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the Free City, guaranteeing the rule of law as well as a series of rights to the citizens of that town. Thus, in the Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Pree City opinion (1935) , 45 the Court analyzed the matter and keenly protected principles su ch as nulla poe na sine lege and other rule of law tenets. The public utility of these "rule oflaw"-matters need hardly be stressed. 13 . Equality of Treatment. The Court often paid attention to ste er an interpretive course that would ensure equality among the parties. Thus, in the Diversion ofWater from the Meuse case (1937) , 46 the Court refused an interpretation which would have led to recognizing a right to the Netherlands which Belgium would not have enjoyed under the same treaty (non-reciprocity). In the absence of clear terms to that effect, the Court refused to engage in the recognition of su ch a non-reciprocallegal situation. In more than one individual or dissenting opinion, Judges of the PCIJ m01·eover cautioned for a restrictive interpretation of clauses that contained an inequality of treatment. One may for example quo te Judge Anzilotti in the Lighthouses case of 1934, where there was in his eyes an inequality between the Powers on the one si de and the Balkan States on the other (under article 9 of a relevant agreement). 47 The link with public utility is again qui te manifest. Inequality of the parties is always in tension with the principle of justice. It also jeopardizes the effectiveness of a solution, which, when felt as being unjust, risks being contested and possibly undone.
14. Proper Administration o.fjustice. We may close the list of our examples with the law of the PCIJ itself. The Court recognized that the 'proper administration ofjustice' 48 was a paramount parameter in its application of the law. Thus, for example, the Court had to be vigilant not ta allow the claimant to change radically the extent of the dispute during the course of the proceedings, since that would jeopardize the rights of the defendant State. The Court th us devised criteria asto su ch a transformation of the requests, and th us ultimately of the dispute brought before it: see the Société Commerciale de Belgique case 44 The Memoirs of the League Delegate on the spot are most interesting to read: (1939). 49 There is another prominent area where the Court applied this principle, namely in the context of agreements of the parties to a dispute which purported to derogate from the Statute of the Court. The PCIJ here protected the integrity of its Statute, which it treated as a type of peremptory norm to which the occasional parties to a dispute had to bow. As the Court itself put it in the case on the Compatibility of certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City (1935): "Whereas the decision of the Court must be in accordance with its Statu te and with the Rules ... ". 50 Sorne examples of this limb of the case law may be given. First, in the Free Zones case (Order, 1929) the special agreement contained a provision contrary to the Statu te. The parties had jointly asked the Court to provide a non-official indication of the results of its deliberations prior to the giving of formai judgment. But und er Article 54, § 3 of the Statu te, the Court's deliberations were secret. The Court the re fore refused this request: "[ t ]he spirit and letter of its Statu te, in particular Articles 54, paragraph 2, and 58, do not allow the Court 'unofficially' to communicate to the representatives of the Parties to a case 'the result of the deliberation' on a question submitted to it for a decision; as, in contradistinction to that which is permitted by the Rules (Article 32 [ now 101 ]), the Court cannat, on the proposai of the Parties, depart from the terms of the Statu te". 5L Further, the Court has always refused to allow States, even by agreement, ta seek an advisory opinion. It has considered this limitation on the right to seek advisory opinions a rule of imperative law. It has refused to respond to requests which appear to be simply seeking an opinion, whether the request is unilateral 5 2 or made jointly. 53 Moreover, in sorne cases, the advance interpretation of a text can be incompatible with the Court's judicial function and consequently also with its Statute. In the Free Zones case (Orcier, 1929), the parties had asked the Court to declare whether the Versailles Treaty had abrogated, or was designed to abrogate, the free zones. The Court refused to allow itself ta be boxed in by a precletermined interpretation, since the Treaty might have neither of tho se effects: " [ to choose between constructions determined beforehand none of which may correspond to the opinion at which it may arrive ... ". 54 Finally, parties are not allowed to subordinate the binding or executory character of the judgment to conditions not recognized by the Statu te. In the Free Zones case, (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) , the special agreement provided that, if the judgment countenanced the importation of merchandise in bond or at reduced customs duties, that aspect of it would be subject to the assent of both parties. The Court considered that condition to be contrary to the Statute. 55 Ali these examples show th at the Court protected the integrity of its Statute (and Rules) as against derogation by particular agreements. A public utility layer is here defined and enforced against a singular utility layer. Tt can be expressed as follows: the Statu te is a legal agreement rooted in the community of ali the States parties to it. Conversely, parties to a particular dispute have to take it as it stands, since they are not the masters of that agreement and can not alter it by their particular action.
III
The PCIJ and Utilitas Singulorum 62 The manifest problem of the maxim is that a restrictive interpretation works to the benefit of one State and of its sovereignty, but also to the detriment of the other State and of its sovereignty. Why should the Court privilege one sovereignty over the other? ·In a variant to the principle discussed, the PCIJ recognized that restrictions on the territorial jurisdiction of States are not to be presumed. Thus, in the Railway Tra:ffic case of 1931, 63 the PC IJ refused to deduce from article 23, letter e ), of the League of Nations Covenant a duty to open up a railway line, even if that line was of international interest. In its eyes, the provision was not specifie enough to overcome the freedom of action of a State on its own territory. The same principle was applied mutatis mutandis in the Polish War Vessels in the Port ofDanzi,q opinion (1931) 64 or in the Memel Territory case (merits, 1932). 65 There are other holdings directly linked with sovereignty, such as the upholding of the qualified unanimity-voting mle in the Mossul opinion (1925) 66 or the domestic jurisdiction-principle consiclered in the Nationality Decrees opinion the direct agreement between the parties. This short expression contains a whole lot of information as to how the Court perceives its role and as to the type of litigation taking place in front of it. The litigation is manifestly of a purely private law type: there is ajudge only if the parties (or the claimant) so demand, and only so long as the demand remains. Further, the Court is there to aid the parties to settle the ir dispute. It will not impose its jurisdiction in arder to se cure public interests in the application of the rule of law. Th us, States may settle a dispute by avoiding the application of the law and rather by creating new law, through their direct agreement. Such dispute settlement is cast in a context where the singular interest takes precedence over the public utility.
5· Duty to make reparation. In two extremely famous dicta, the PCIJ recognized the duty of aState having breached an international obligation to make reparation to the aggrieved State. The classic passages are to be found in the Chorzow Factory case (1928) . 73 The duty to make reparation is there to reestablish the equilibrium between the parties in a legal transaction or situation, which has been disturbed by the breach of the law of one party against the other. The compensatory side of the duty casts it squarely into the realm of singular utility: the point of the legal rule is to prote ct the rights and the pa trimany of a subject as against attacks by another subject. The private utility in the maintenance of a given situation of a subject is the matter protected by the legal rule. It stands to reason that there are also public utilities in not allowing a subject to reap advantages by the breach of legal rules, and th us in not giving it incentives to breach the law.
6. Force majeure. Force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness has been recognized by the PCIJ in the two quite singular cases relating to Serbian Loans (1929)1 4 and to Brazilian Loans (1929) . 75 If allowed, this circumstance works to the benefit of the State prevailing itself upon it. Convers ely, the legal rule normally applicable will be sacrificed. At best, there can be found an equitable aspect to the rule, which could relate to some public utility. The gist of the matter remains however rooted in singular utility. 80 that aState could acquire a title to terri tory wh en the re is an intention ta act in the quality of a sovereign and when the reis some effective display of public authority on a part of a terri tory. On the other hand, there must be a passivity or acquiescence by the State claiming concurrent titles. This acquisitive prescription allows a State to increase its territorial domain and therefore its rights. It therefore works in the first place in the singular interest of the States, even if, as already explained, the institution is also tmited in exigencies of legal security, protection of legitima te expectations and equitable considerations. In regard of these latter points, public utilities come to the fore. The institution of prescription is thus a good example of a mixed legal institution, where singular and public utilities add up one to the other while pulling in the same direction. 
IV Conclusion
The examples of the two utilities given may suffi ce to provide a vivid picture of the subject matter. A legal arder is al ways made to respond to needs on the collective and on the individual plane. The interests the law protects are situated on these two planes. Any legal arder can thus be analyzed as to the specifie equilibrium it ensures between these sometimes countervailing, and sornetimes converging, forces. The same is true for the case law of a judicial body.
Where is the case law of the PC IJ situated in the spectrum of the two planes and the ir respective forces? A summary perusal of its jurisprudence shows that it is mistaken to consider the PCIJ as being the champion of the singular utility rooted in the sovereignty of States, i.e. in the "Lotus society". The only judgment, which can be mobilized unreservedly in this direction, is precisely the Lotus case of 1927. For the rest of its jurisprudence, the PCIJ showed a remarkable, and for the time even unexpected, sensitivity for common concerns and for public interests. Tt was therefore a true "public internationallaw"-tribunal. Tt was magisterially attentive to the proper needs of this parti cul ar legal order, and this to an extent no municipal tribunal could ever have reached. At the same time, the PCIJ was a highly realistic tribunal, taking keen account of the needs of States and of the necessary concessions its case law had to make to the ir commutative justice and sovereign freedom. It is doubtlessly the careful equilibrium between these two fundamental forces, centrifugai and centripetal, community-oriented and State-oriented, an equilibrium obtained through extremely meticulous interpretations of legal texts, which makes the heart of the Court's contribution to international society, and which explains up to this day itslong-lasting success. The ICJ could then take up and over the flambeau at the place the PCIJ had left it, at once alive and lively. 
